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ABSTRACT
Incentives in exchange for votes during elections have become a culture in Nigeria. Past studies emphasized on 
monetary incentives while no known studies have been carried out on the new dimension of incentives to influence 
voters' turnout adopted in 2014 and 2015 gubernatorial elections in Nigeria. This paper attempts to uncover what is 
behind people’s voting behaviour in gubernatorial elections (2014 and 2015) in Southwestern, Nigeria using 
questionnaire administered to 1266 respondents and 76 respondents were interviewed. Results showed that parties' 
candidates distributed customized goods (69.3%), credit cards and branded goods collected in kangaroo ceremonies 
and social media (58.2%) to entice voters. Financial aids were given to rural women prior and during elections by 
traditional institutions and security agents. The paper concludes that candidates and collaborators who used any 
forms of incentives to entice voters or influence the outcome of elections deserve prosecution.
Key words: Incentives, Dimensional, Voters' turnout, Gubernatorial elections, Southwestern
Received: 7th July, 2016 Accepted: 30th July, 2016 Published: 31st July, 2016
INTRODUCTION
Liberal democracy is increasingly becoming an 
institutionalized system across sub-Saharan Africa, 
with voting behaviour playing a vital role in the 
democratic process. In this system, people are the 
source of authority and the majority dictates major 
policy outcomes and decisions. Held (2006) noted 
that democracy has become a fundamental standard 
of political legitimacy in the globalised world. Due to 
the distinct role of voting and the importance of 
majority participation as a cardinal feature of 
democracy, politicians are now doing everything 
possible to appeal to the electorates during the 
election periods. Incentives and material gains are 
given to prospective voters to influence their votes in 
both campaign and election periods (Adeleke, 2006). 
The use of incentives and material gains in elections 
has become a culture in Nigeria and voters had 
become accustomed to receiving bribes, no matter 
how small, in exchange for their votes. Many 
political gladiators tried to meet the personal needs of 
voters during campaign rallies and election periods. 
Voters resulted to extortion of money from 
candidates as only way to benefit before they are 
voted into power. The voters had resulted to meeting 
their immediate needs with the fear that public office 
holders leave them to their fates after they have 
elected. Many electorates are poor and little 
incentives in any form, be it material gains or 
monetary gifts, have an enormous impacts on their 
living conditions. In major general elections in 
Nigeria, money, other items (foodstuffs, drinks, salt, 
soap, mattresses, plates and cooking pans) go a long 
way in solving people's immediate needs.
Despite legal implication and regulations that 
prohibit vote buying or bribery of voters, in various 
Electoral acts in Nigeria, many still practice these 
criminal acts during general elections. Beside, these 
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acts are morally unacceptable generally because the 
cultures and customs of many tribes in Nigeria are 
against these acts. Also in democracy, the act negated 
political development and yet, politicians still 
involved in this devastated act (Okafor, 2009). 
Contrarily to many decent sections in Electoral laws, 
many Nigeria politicians who understand the level of 
poverty among the rural and urban people entice the 
voters during elections. After being voted in, some 
politicians may decide never to return to the voters or 
even deliver the required social services during their 
term of office (Okafor, 2009). Like any other country 
in Africa, Nigeria has some social disparities as a 
result of a high incidence of poverty. People in rural 
areas are worse off when compared to the urban 
centres due to lack of basic services such as 
electricity, drinking water, roads, health care, 
education and social insurance. Rural dwellers 
suffered tremendously from hunger, malnutrition and 
preventable disease. With little enticements and 
incentives, many voters easily exchange their votes. 
Scholars like Aiyede and Aregbeyan (2012) has 
tagged Nigeria's politics as 'moneybag politics' since 
the huge amount is needed for both campaigns and 
entice voters. To them, many aspiring candidates 
with little money and high mentality are afraid to join 
active politics because of the huge amounts of money
needed. Moneybags and god-fatherism dominates the 
political arena since middle earned people and civil 
servants cannot afford the required funds needed to 
participate effectively in the elections (Aiyede and 
Aregbeyan, 2012). In this aspect, voters look unto 
wealthy and moneybag politicians and the issues of 
ability and competency of people are ignored.
Due to globalization of the system and the widely 
accepted principles in modernization and 
developmental models, the political leaders are quite 
aware of the importance of voters in a democratic 
system. Different strategies have been applied to 
sensitize voters to their parties' side and many 
policies and programmes are packaged are in their 
manifestoes to woo them. Although, the concept of 
money incentives during the campaign and voting 
processes was not new in Nigeria's political and 
democratic era and many studies had centered much 
on this types of incentive. In this regard, many 
sections of Electoral Acts forbid money incentive as 
criminal and unlawful acts during the election period. 
Based on this awareness by all stakeholders, and the 
electoral umpires and security agents, the politicians 
devolved another dimension of incentives. Against 
this background, this study was intended to examine 
the influence of new dimensional incentives on 
voters’ turnout in the gubernatorial elections in 
Southwestern states, Nigeria.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK
Liberal democracy has been entrenched as a system 
of government across several nations because of its 
enormous advantages. As a result of the fundamental 
benefits of democracy, countries that were previously 
considered undemocratic like as Argentina in 1983, 
Bolivia, Uruguay in 1984, Brazil in 1985 and Chile in 
the early 1990s, have now embraced the system. 
Several African countries have also keyed into this 
global trend particularly due to its developmental 
opportunities and current data show that about one 
hundred and thirty-five countries had entrenched 
democratic models and principles compared to forty 
countries in 1972. Scholars like Plattner and Espada 
(2000), Vincente (2007) and Collier and Rohner, 
(2008) have argued that if this trend continues with 
this momentum, liberal democratic system may 
become the universal standard of governance in 
human society. In liberal democratic settings, voting 
in elections remains one of the cardinal principles but 
in recent times, a steady decline in the established 
democracies has been recorded (Achyuta and Fenske, 
2013). Although, a number of factors have been
identified to influence voting behaviours, scholars 
however, have classified them into short-term or 
long-term factors (Blaydes, 2006; Besley 
and Kudamatsu, 2007). In the past studies, there are 
little empirical evidence related to the use of 
enticement during general elections. This study, 
therefore, examines this new dimension of material 
incentive introduced on voters’ turnout in the 2014 
and 2015 gubernatorial elections in Southwestern 
States, Nigeria.
The term ‘incentive and material gains’ refers to the 
exchange of goods for political support or in 
exchange for their votes during elections. Though, 
similar concept like clientelism, refers to an enduring 
exchange relationship between patron and client 
(Hicken, 2002).
Also, the concept of incentive or new dimensional 
incentive are very similar to old concepts such as 
vote buying and different scholars such as Brusco, 
Nazareno and Stokes (2004) define vote-buying as 
the proffering to voters of cash or (more commonly) 
minor consumption goods by political parties, in 
office or in opposition, in exchange for the recipient’s 
vote. Also, Finan and Schechter (2012) provide a 
logic definition that vote-buying as offered goods to 
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specific individuals before an election in exchange 
for their votes while Kramon (2009) defines it as the 
distribution of particularistic or private material 
benefits with the expectation of political support. In 
Nichter's (2008) opinion, he defines vote-buying as 
opposed to turnout buying and just as exchanging of 
rewards for vote choices. Out of all these definitions 
of the concept of vote-buying, this one by Meirowitz 
and Kenneth (2009) is considered as the closest to the 
new dimensional incentive in this study and he 
defines vote-buying as any instance by which cash, 
liquor, food, clothes or milk/refreshments (are 
distributed) as enticement to vote or mobilize. 
Finally, Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno and Brusco 
(2012) have recently labeled vote-buying as a 
situation in which political machines try to bribe and 
persuade people to vote for them. In this paper, 
dimensional incentives can be defined as a 
transaction whereby candidates distribute private 
goods such as cash and gifts in exchange for electoral 
support or higher turnout. The direct implication of 
this definition is that vote-shares and turnout would 
have been lower in the absence of electoral handouts.
In Nigeria's democratic process, the concept of 
'sincere voting' as argued by Razim (2003) occurs 
when a voter supports their most favoured candidate 
while Myatt's (2012) logic argument lies in the fact 
that a voter may be concerned not to waste their vote 
on a candidate with limited viability. In Nigeria, 
many mushroom political parties are registered and 
some are with no campaign structures or candidates 
in an election, some little supporters may decide not 
to waste their vote, and choose to support someone 
other than their preferred candidate. A voter 
considers the tradeoff between her preference for 
candidates versus the likelihood of influencing the 
outcome of the election.
Many scholars such as Castanheira (2003), Razin 
(2003) and Meirowitz and Shotts (2009) considered 
factors beyond pure policy comparisons of parties 
and Castanheira (2003) in particular argues that 
voters care about how their precinct votes in terms of 
potentially courting favour from the victorious party. 
For example, relatively few voters receive goods 
from the party in Stokes (2005) of Argentinean party 
workers; they were given ten tiny bags of food with 
which to buy the 40 voters in her neighborhood. 
Although in developed democratic countries, the 
receipt of bribes does not guarantee that voters 
support the party (Brusco et al., 2004). In the same 
vein, Guterbock (1980) studies found that Chicago 
residents who received party service were no more 
likely to vote Democratic than those receiving no 
favour. In his further argument, contingent prizes 
motive individual voters to turnout in support of a 
party in the hope of winning prizes. In Myerson's 
(2000) study, parties offer contingent prizes to those 
identifiable groups of voters that offer the highest 
level of political support. He argues further that even 
in large populations, in which voters have little 
influence on the outcome of elections, they retain 
significant influence over the distribution of prizes. 
Political parties in both competitive and non-
competitive environments, an incentive to encourage 
factions so as to manage turnout and achieve the 
appearance of a mandate whether they are popular or 
not. Stokes (2005) argued that distributional patterns 
of those who receive material gifts in Argentina with 
low incomes are likely to be targeted. Kramon (2009) 
observed that swing voters and those with low-
incomes are more likely to be targeted for 
mobilization purposes in Kenya. The same opinion is 
shared with other African countries where people are 
living below poverty level. Brusco et al. (2004) and 
Nichter (2008) also provide evidence that political 
parties target low-income individuals. 
In Nigeria where people live below the international 
standard of living and per capita income are too low, 
many Nigeria's voters may not consider their future 
welfare but their present economic needs, which 
determines their happiness. Like indicated in the 
analysis of Krueger and Stone (2014) that well-being 
shapes election outcomes. He further argues that 
country’s aggregate level of life satisfaction is able to 
account for the variance in vote shares in general 
elections over the past four decades. As a result of 
poor standard of living in Nigeria where majority 
lives in abject poverty, the threat of being voted out 
of office induces politicians to act in voters’ interests 
(Besley, 2006; Okafor, 2009). Though it is evident 
that economic voting or incentives voting presents 
politicians with electoral incentives to ensure a 
healthy economy, but the empirical focus on 
economic accountability leaves open the possibility 
that office holders may be left unrestrained in a range 
of other policy making areas that matter to people. 
Evidence from the gubernatorial elections in the 
Southwestern, Nigeria showed that there is a link 
between happiness (through immediate incentive) 
and voting over and above parties' policies or the 
state of the economy.
The theory of social exchange is very useful because 
it explains social change and stability as a process of 
negotiated exchange between parties. The exchange 
paradigm has it fundamental premises that all social 
life is treated as an exchange of rewards or resources 
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between actors. The exchange paradigms entertained 
high aspirations in Sociology because of its 
fundamental premise that all life can be treated as an 
exchange of rewards or resources between actors. 
The interactions that exist between human beings are 
established on the norm of reciprocity whether 
positive or negative (Turner, 1998). Social exchange 
theory posits that all human relationships are formed 
by the use of a subjective cost-benefit analysis and 
the comparison of alternatives and sterility as a 
process of negotiated exchange between parties. The 
voters received money and other gifts from the 
politicians or political gladiators in exchange for their 
votes during the election periods. 
In furtherance of this theory, the politicians elected 
by voters into office easily forget about the promise 
they made during the campaign and plight of the 
voters. Though, a person may continue to be in a 
good relationship without adequate satisfaction when 
there is no set of alternative relationship available. In 
a situation when there are many alternatives available 
to an individual, such a person is less dependent on 
such a relationship and vice versa. Exchange 
transactions are reciprocal, if reciprocity relationship 
and mutual concern is not observed such transactions 
may tend to eventually discontinue. The task of social 
exchange theory is then to investigate the reciprocal 
(mainly materials) advantages the individuals draw 
from their exchange transaction on singular premise 
that they engaged in. In addition, in further sustaining 
most social, including non-economic, relations in the 
rational expectations of such advantages 
independently of normative or group considerations. 
This exchange theory provides a clear conception of 
the material and resources basis of social action as 
Cook (2000) put it, since the poverty level of voters 
is high, the first priority is to solve their immediate 
needs. Social action is an exchange of (tangible or 
intangible) activities and reward or cost between 
individual on the ground that people have always 
explained their conduct by means of it benefits and 
costs to them (Molm and Takahashi, 1999). 
The relevance of this theory to this study lies solely 
on the fact that voters or citizens embarked on voting 
exercises on the premises that they voted for their 
representatives. Not everybody will be in public 
offices to determine or take decision that affects all 
but citizens have to delegate their responsibilities to 
the elected candidates to hold the power for them. 
This theory, therefore, rests on the norms of 
reciprocity where one individual obliges another. In 
the social exchange process, a return is expected 
though not by bargaining but left to the discretion of 
the one who makes it. Thus, on one side, the voters 
may decide to vote because of the material reward 
from the political leaders or with great expectation to 
improve the condition of their living standard or 
other demands from the government in term of 
policies and so on. On the other side, the voting 
behaviour of the masses may emanate as a result of 
exchange of materials by politicians (Kranton, 1996). 
In the first place, candidates provided voters with 
material inducements to increase their chances of 
wining an election, especially when there is 
competition or between political parties or political 
actors. Voters on their part may agree to sell their 
votes and support for a particular candidate because 
they value their immediate needs and gains, more 
than they value their preferred political contender.
Although social exchange theory proposes that social 
behaviour is the result of an exchange process, the
purpose of this exchange is to maximize benefits and 
minimize costs, therefore, people weigh the potential 
benefits and risks of social relationships. In this 
situation when the risks outweigh the rewards, people 
will terminate or abandon that relationship; therefore, 
voters who are overwhelmed with poverty do 
participate in elections due to incentives and material 
gains from the politicians and may not enjoy the 
future benefits. Although, scholar such as Blaydes 
(2006) have argued that people with low incomes are 
more likely to be targeted for patronage because their 
'votes are more easily bought and their reliance on 
state patronage is higher'. Chibber (1999) argued that 
voters' turnout to vote because it is their rights to 
fulfill their civil responsibility and apathy recorded 
during an election as a result of poor electoral 
process.
METHODOLOGY
This addresses the research design for the paper, 
which is basically a collection and analysis of data. 
This procedure bridges the gap between the 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of the paper and 
covers study area/setting, research design, study 
population/ sample, sampling procedure, methods 
and instruments of data collection and data analysis.
Study Area/Setting: The six States (Oyo, Osun, 
Ogun, Ondo, Ekiti and Lagos) of Southwestern, 
Nigeria were centered on by the researcher due to 
homogeneity in their culture and uniqueness 
historical background. The Southwestern states' 
records showed voter registration of 12.1, 10.9, 14.3, 
14.3 and 13.7 million (Independent National 
Electoral Commission, 2015) which represented 
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20.9%, 17.9%, 23.2%, 19.5% and 20.1% to total 
voters registration in Nigeria in the 1999, 2003, 2007, 
2011 and 2015 general elections respectively. 
Gubernatorial elections were conducted in the same 
years (1999, 2003 and 2007) in all the southwestern 
of Nigeria. Discrepancies occurred after the 
gubernatorial elections conducted in 2007 elections 
in both Osun and Ekiti states were annulled by court 
in 2010, and newly elected governors have to spend 
4-year term. Based on this, gubernatorial elections 
could not hold in 2011 since the term of the 
incumbent governors has not expired and therefore, 
gubernatorial elections were held in 2014 in Ekiti and 
Osun states. Other four states (Ogun, Ondo, Oyo and 
Lagos) held their gubernatorial elections in the 2015 
general elections. In addition to this, the researcher 
purposively selected two local government areas in 
each state and classified into two groups: 'one rural 
local government area' and 'one urban local 
government area'. The researcher applied simple 
random sampling to select one local government area 
out of the existing rural local government areas in 
each state. 
The 'rural local government areas' selected were as 
followings: Egbedore local government in Osun 
State; Ilejemeje local government in Ekiti State; Ori-
Ire local government in Oyo State; Oke-Igbo local 
government in Ondo State; Ibeju-Lekki local 
government in Lagos State; Imeko-Afon local 
government in Ogun State. Also, the researcher 
selected 'one urban local government area' in each 
state through simple random sampling technique and 
the following local governments selected in each 
State. Osogbo local government from Osun State; 
Ibadan North local government from Oyo State; Ado-
Ekiti East local government from Ekiti State; 
Shagamu local government from Ogun State; Ikeja 
local government from Lagos State; Akure North 
local government from Ondo State.
Study Design, Sampling technique and Data 
Collection: The study is a cross- sectional survey
adopting both primary and secondary sources of data 
collection. In primary sources, quantitative and 
qualitative methods of data collection were utilised. 
The selection of sample size in this study was based 
on multistage sampling which involved the use of 
probability and non- probability sampling methods. 
Non-probability methods involved in this study is 
only on the use of purposive sampling while 
probability methods included on the use of simple 
random sampling and stratified sampling techniques.
Study Population/ Sample Size: In both the urban 
and rural local government areas, 70 respondents 
were selected from each local government. The total 
respondents selected in all the rural local 
governments in the study were 420 respondents while 
420 respondents were selected from the urban local 
government areas in the study. The respondents were 
all active voters who voted completely at least four 
times in any general elections. The researcher applied 
convenience sampling to arrive at the sample size on 
active voter in both the rural and urban areas in the 
selected local governments. The next stage of data 
collection involved the compilation of names of all 
the parties' candidates in the two major parties (1) 
Peoples' Democratic Party and (2) Alliance for 
Democracy later changed to 'Action Congress of 
Nigeria' and again transformed to 'All Progressive 
Congress') that contested general elections from 1999 
to 2015 from their parties' records. The researcher 
traced all the political gladiators to various respective 
offices and their residential houses among those who 
joined active voters to form the sample size. The 
researcher selected 71 respondents who were political 
gladiators each from the six selected states. The study 
adopted simple random sampling to select the sample 
size of 426 respondents. In all, the total numbers of 
1266 respondents were selected and issues 
concerning the use of incentives, material gifts in 
both campaigns, voting and election processes were 
focused.
Data Collection: A well structured questionnaire 
was used for data collection and questionnaire was 
administered to 1266 respondents. In order to 
complement the findings from the quantitative data, 
In-depth interviews were also utilized. Respondents 
were selected from the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC), Parties' leaders in two 
selected major political parties in Southwestern 
States, and active voters within the selected rural and 
urban local governments. A total of 76 respondents 
were selected, out of this number, INEC staff were 
15, Party Leaders were 13 and 48 Active voters were 
interviewed. The in-depth focused on issues relating 
to the use of incentives and material gifts to entice 
voters on the election and campaign periods by 
political gladiators, and political parties. The in-depth 
interview questions prone further on the level of 
operation and ways the incentives reached the voters 
during the campaign and election periods. Data 
collected from quantitative methods were analyzed 
using descriptive and statistical percentage and 
qualitative data were analyzed through content 
analysis.
On the secondary sources of data collection, this 
study utilized historical/ archival records to generate 
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secondary data. The Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) publications and records, 
newspapers, magazines, academic journals and other 
publications that are relevant to the subject matter 
were sought to complement data generated from 
primary sources.
Data Analysis: Data collected from the quantitative 
methods were analyzed using descriptive statistical 
tools (percentage) while qualitative data were 
analyzed through content analysis. On the secondary 
sources of data collection, this study utilized 
historical/archival records to generate secondary data. 
The Independent National Electoral Commission 
(INEC) publications and records, newspapers, 
magazines, academic journals and other publications 
that are relevant to the subject matter were sought to 
complement data generated from primary sources.
RESULTS
The results showed that respondents' age was 
52.716.8 years; 63.4% were males and 36.6% were 
females. About 64.0% of the respondent’s perceived 
democracy as beneficial, while 72.5% indicated that 
the system was characterized by many flaws. The 
result indicated that all the respondents were 
qualified to vote during the 2014 and 2015 
gubernatorial elections in southwestern, Nigeria. It 
further indicated that many respondents believed that 
the best form of government is democracy but many 
identified flaws in the political and electoral 
processes in Nigeria.
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The objective of the paper was to examine the new 
approach of distribution of incentives to voters in 
Southwestern States of Nigeria during the 2014 and 
2015 gubernatorial elections. The findings showed 
that 29.2% of the respondents strongly agreed and 
40.1% agreed that money was collected prior to 
election day during the gubernatorial elections in 
2014 and 2015 in southwestern, Nigeria. Only 2.2% 
of the respondents were undecided; 20.6% disagreed
while 7.9% strongly disagreed. The results also 
showed that 69.3% of the respondents agreed that 
political leaders and parties' candidates distributed 
money a day and a week before the elections. As 
regards voters demand for money, 31.6% of the 
respondents strongly agreed, while 26.6% agreed 
that voters demand money from politicians on the 
election days. On the other divide, 19.4% and 15.9% 
strongly disagreed and disagreed respectively, while 
6.5% were undecided. Interestingly, 58.2% of the 
respondents agreed that they collected money from 
politicians before going to the polling booth on the 
election day. 
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The result further showed that 22.8% of the 
respondents strongly agreed, while 33.5% and 26.5% 
agreed and disagreed respectively, that branded 
goods were exchanged for votes on the day of 
elections; as 6.3% strongly disagreed. Only 4.4% 
were undecided on whether there was exchange of 
branded goods for votes. The findings also revealed 
that 33.1% of the respondents strongly agreed that 
money incentives were given to prospective voters in 
an organized kangaroo cooperative, while 35.7% 
agreed; but 9.7%, 14.0% and 7.5%,of the 
respondents strongly disagreed, disagreed and 
undecided respectively. The result of the findings 
also showed that 44.8% of the respondents strongly 
agreed, while 27.2%of the respondents agreed that 
money for political gains were exchanged in funeral 
ceremonies prior to elections; though 18.2% and  
8.1% disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively; 
while only 1.7% of the respondents were undecided.
One of the rural voters corroborated these findings 
and stated that: 
“I started voting since the 1999 general 
elections and I have never seen an election 
where the candidates did not distribute 
goods and money prior to the election day 
or on the election day. Each compound has 
compiled names with the Baale (compound 
heads) and village heads, and with which
party leaders distribute monies and goods. It 
is a normal tradition to do so because 
nobody will leave his or her farm work to 
vote. I collected vests, ankara clothes, 
kerosene and rice in this last election and it 
is a normal practice during an election time 
(Man/Active Voter/Rural Local Government 
Area/Osun State/ 2015).”
In order to buttress the above findings, a respondent 
said:
The politicians in our community are wiser 
nowadays; some formed kangaroo 
cooperative societies prior to the election 
time. They organized a unit that borrow 
them token money and appeal and campaign 
underneath. Other political parties 
organized mushroom parties or funeral 
ceremonies of their party leaders who died 
10 years ago to woo voters. In this kangaroo 
parties, they gave different types of goods 
including clothes, kerosene, and other 
customized gifts and items. Others 
distributed network credit cards in the 
ceremony. I joined a group in whatApps and 
I received Etisalat call cards of two hundred 
naira weekly prior to the election day (Man/ 
Active Voter/ Rural Local Government 
Area/Osun State/2015).
In addition to this, a respondent boldly said in an 
interview that:
You cannot question me about this 
incentive; we collect money in this 
community before going out to vote, I was 
given branded rice and customized 
kerosene, and later given five thousand 
naira on the election day in 2015 
presidential elections. The moment the 
announcement of the winners by the 
electoral body, you will not see them 
again. I decided to vote once without any 
stipend and any form of inducement since 
the 1999general elections. People were 
making jest of me by calling me different 
names such as 'mama ilu ebo' or ' mama 
Londoner', which literally means 'a 
foreign mother' or 'London mother'. Look 
at my community. Do you see any effect of 
democracy or dividend of democracy in 
my village? We see them after four years 
when the election is drawing nearer 
again. I see the incentives as a way of 
collecting my share of the national cake 
from these greedy 
politicians (Woman/Active Voter/Urban 
local government/Ekiti State/2015).”
Another objective was to examine the perception of 
respondents on identified lapses in the system and 
methods the voters received the incentives. The result 
of the findings showed that 39.6% and 23.7% of the 
respondents strongly agreed and agreed respectively, 
that voters were ignorant of any laws against the 
collection of bribe or incentives during election. Only 
5.7% of the respondents were undecided, but 17.2%
and 15.8.8% disagreed and strongly disagreed
respectively. The result indicated that majority of the 
respondent (61.3%) claimed ignorance of any 
electoral acts or laws against the collection of money 
in exchange for their votes. On the fact that 
enticements has become a culture and practice during 
election periods, 31.6%, 19.4%, 26.6% and 15.9% 
of the respondents strongly agreed, agreed, strongly 
disagreed and disagreed respectively. Only 6.5% of 
the respondents were undecided. This result indicated 
that 75.5% of the respondents agreed that it was the 
norm to pay for votes since the 1999 general 
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elections and some traditional institutions in their 
areas always served as collaborators or middleman in 
the last 2015 general election periods. 
The result further showed that 16.2% of the 
respondents strongly agreed and 31.8% agreed that 
traditional institutions served as collaborators who 
distributed goods and incentives to their subordinates 
during the 2014 and 2015 gubernatorial elections in 
Southwestern, Nigeria. But 33.6% disagreed, while
7.9% strongly disagreed. Only 10.6% were 
undecided on whether the traditional institutions were 
involved in the channeling incentives to their 
subordinate
.
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The result further revealed that 34.3% of the 
respondents strongly agreed as 29.1% agreed that 
voters ignored good policies and campaigns during 
the 2014 and 2015 gubernatorial elections. But 15.9 
and 18.2% of the respondents strongly disagreed and 
disagreed respectively, while 2.5% were undecided.
In order to corroborate these findings, respondents 
said that:
I am not aware of any law against the 
collection of money before I vote. It is normal 
in this community and everybody irrespective 
of their political affiliations collect money a 
month before the election. But when the 
election is drawing nearer like a week, the 
party leaders and political candidates 
distribute branded material goods to their 
party stalwarts and followers. Immediately 
the elections is fast approaching, like a day 
before the election, the traditional institutions 
such as the village leaders, compound 
leaders and party leaders distribute money to 
prospective voters in the various wards, 
polling booths and villages. Nobody in my 
community has ever been arrested and there
is no such report from any enforcement or 
security agents. I am not aware of any law 
against collection of money during election 
or campaign periods. After all, it is not 
distributed on the day of election but in the 
mid-night of election (Man/ Active Voter/ 
Rural Local Government Area/Ondo 
State/2015).
Also, one of the party leaders lamented that:
My party campaigned to all the wards and 
local government areas telling them our 
programmes and policies of the party and 
candidates but nobody was ready to listen to 
us. The only language the voters understand 
is money and nothing else, no matter how 
good the programmes are. The few that 
attended rallies still expected money from us. 
We organized seminars and informed them 
about their future being at risk if they failed 
to vote wisely. We warned them against 
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moneybag politics but few of them honour 
visitations despite public media 
announcements. The incumbent government 
shared dollars in all the areas. Branded and 
customized rice, and kerosene were 
distributed till the election day and we were 
defeated with wide margins. Also, traditional 
institutions in the rural areas colluded with 
greedy politicians to distribute these 
materials easily for the rural voters (Man / 
Party leader / Urban local government 
Area/Ogun State/2015).
Other objective of the study was to find out the 
effectiveness of these incentives on voter’s turnout 
during an election. The result revealed that 67.3% of 
the respondents agreed that no matter the political 
awareness and enlightenment programmes prior to 
the elections, voters will not come out to vote unless 
money has been distributed to them; that the bigger 
the money distributed in an area, the higher the 
voters' turnout.
In order to complement this, one of the party leaders 
of a popular political party said:
The voters were enticed with cash and goods 
everywhere, and cajoled into voting 
according to our instructions and order. The 
exercise of 2007 to 2015 general elections in 
particular was more of a show of financial 
strength than the capturing of the wishes of 
the people. Right inside the entrance to 
polling booth, the prospective voters will 
even ask for cash or foodstuff before going to 
vote. I covered three wards in my local 
government area and employed services of 
party agents and community heads in 
distributing money a day before the election. 
There are some voters that cannot be touched 
but party agents monitored their votes and 
paid them after elections. We called that one 
'see and buy' and payment is made on spot 
without the attention of the enforcement 
agents. Voters have been used to this act 
before they vote (Man/ Party Leader/ Urban 
local government/Lagos state/ 2015).
One of the Independent National Electoral 
Commission officials who were interviewed on the 
use of new dimensional incentives and money during 
general elections corroborated this and he said:
I was transferred from a neighboring State to 
this place and have been monitoring and 
conducting elections since the 1999 general 
elections. Distribution of gifts, money and 
goods has become a tradition. Prior to the 
elections, all parties distributed rice, 
kerosene, palm oil, clothes, and exercise 
books under the pretence that they alleviated 
poverty from the midst of people. Even during 
the election, in the midst of security agents 
they distributed money to people and I want 
to make it clear to you that the higher the 
money or materials distributed by a party, the 
higher the turnout and votes they received. 
All parties distributed one thing or the other 
on the days of election. Look at this last 
election, dollars and new naira notes were 
distributed openly during the gubernatorial 
and presidential elections (Woman/ 
Independent National Electoral Commission 
staff/Oyo State/2015).
DISCUSSION
It is pertinent to note that voters in the southwestern, 
Nigeria were influenced by these new dimension 
incentives due to economic hardship and failure of 
the politicians to meet up with their promises. These 
findings agreed with the analysis of Krueger and 
Stone (2014) that well-being of citizen shapes 
election outcomes. He further argues that country’s 
aggregate level of life satisfaction is able to account 
for the variance in vote shares in general elections 
over the past four decades. Also, the result of the 
finding tally with the assertion of (Okafor, 2009) that 
politicians may decide never to return to the voters or 
even deliver the required social services during their 
term of office but give incentives required before the 
voting period. In this finding, majority of the 
respondents believed that it is morally rights to 
collect incentive before exercising their voting rights 
and the notion hold that the higher the incentives 
collected from one party before the election  the 
higher the votes. The result of the findings further 
showed that majority respondent agreed that political 
leaders and parties' candidates distributed money a 
day and a week before the elections through 
traditional institutions and powerful agents. Though, 
government provides the rules and regulation to 
sustain the social system by establishing various 
institutions that conduct various elections, yet, 
political stakeholders assess the process based on 
their selfishness and criminally acts to win the 
elections. Based on the objective of the paper to 
examine the new approach different from money to 
entice voters, the result of the finding showed that 
voters were entice during the gubernatorial elections 
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in the southwestern, Nigeria with goods and material 
designed to entice the voters.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Voters were entice with incentives and material 
goods such as stipend money in 'kangaroo 
cooperatives and funeral parties', branded goods by 
both political parties and party candidates during the 
gubernatorial elections in 2014 in Ekiti and Osun 
states and 2015 gubernatorial in four other states 
(Oyo, Ogun, Lagos and Ondo) in the southwestern, 
Nigeria. Given money and other induced-goods has 
become a norm and tradition between the political 
gladiators and voters during the campaign periods 
and election time. Incentives and these material gifts 
were channelised to the voters through some 
traditional institutions and party leaders while credit 
cards distributed in social media. The result of 
findings indicated that the higher the money and 
material goods distributed by a party or candidates, 
the higher the votes received before such a party or 
candidate ceteris paribus. People were no more 
interested in party manifestoes and programmes but 
money and goods received from parties or 
candidates. Besides, it was found in the study that 
after elected public office holders by the people they 
left the voters without given them dividend of 
democracy or improved their living conditions. 
Therefore, all campaigns and elections funds should 
be disclosed and mandated institutions should 
strengthen civic and voting education. Courts should 
be established to punish any politician, traditional 
rulers and political parties that decided to influence 
the voters with incentives or material gains. 
Candidates who use money to bribe voters and 
influence the outcome of elections should disqualify 
and prosecute accordingly. There is also need for 
mass awareness by government and non-
governmental agencies on the need for good-policy 
party. Government needs to formulate and alleviate 
alleviation programmes and policies to reduce 
poverty level among people so that maximum 
participation without incentives will be achieved.
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